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THE SUPREME 
THE STATE OF 
:y S. HANSEN, et al., for hi:m.telf 




-vs. - ..•. 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GARY S. HANSEN, et al., for himself 
aud for and on lwhalf of 191 other per-
sons simi1arl.Y sitnah•d, 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
- vs. -
!OOD OF LOCOMOTIVE 
AND ENGINEMEN and 
LODGE S-!4 of BROTHERHOOD OF 





REPLY BRIEF' OF DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS 
BROTH8HHOOD OF LOCOMOTIYE FIREMEN AND 
ENGIN81\fEN and LODGE 844 of BROTHERHOOD 
OF' LOCOl\TOTIYE FIREMEN AND ENGINEMEN 
As snggcst('d b!· Rale 75(p) (2), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, this re1)l!· brief will be limited to an-
swering new matters set forth in Respondents' brief. 
Appellant::; feel that Respondents have not met the argu-
ment s!:'t forth in their brief in chief, and will not dwell 
on Rt>spondcnts' arguments as such. However, Appel-
lants fePl that Rt:•spondPnts have grossly miscited and 
misconstrnPd the facts shown in the record. The record 
1 
certainly speaks for itself, but Ap1wllants feel dn: 
bound to point out to the court the glaring errors a: 
inconsistencies of Respondents' brief in this f"g" 
uf1j 
Therefore, this reply brief will attempt to point out 
errors and inconsistencies by highlighting portiom, 
the record and Respondents' brief. Space does not 
111
., 
mit, and it would serve no purposP, to attPmpt tr1 1, 
argue the brief in chief herein. 
POINT I 
THE FINDINGS OF FACT UPON WHICH THE 
JUDGMENT BELOW IS BASED ARE NOT SUP-
PORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
1. The evidence does not support the finding that 
plaintiff Oliver was ever a member of the 
BLF&E. 
Respondents, m their brief (hereinafter cited a' 
Resp. Br.), assert that defendants produced no record' 
at trial indicating that Oliver had not made dues pa: 
ments. (Resp. Br. at 5.) Oliver, as a plaintiff, had th" 
burden to prove that he was a member of the BLF&E 
Defendants were not obligated to producP any recoru' 
of Kennecott Copper Corporation. If plaintiff Olire; 
wished to prove he had paid dues, it was his burden t1 
produce such records. All of the records kept by th, 
BLF&E indicate that Oliver never paid dues to !ht 
BLF&E. (R. 998; 924; 938; Exhibit D-190.) 
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2. The evidence does not support the finding that 
alleged plaintiff Esquivel is a proper party 
plaintiff. 
Rrspondents assert that defendants "had practical 
nutice" of plaintiff gsquivel's joinder. (Resp. Br. at 7.) 
In the final "Supplemental Notice of J oinder and Repre-
sentation of Plaintiffs" filed on May 24, 1968, (R. 232-
I counsrl for plaintiffs state: 
Tlw atta<'hed arnended Exhibit I, Part B, con-
tains the names of those individuals who are mem-
bers of the <'lass of plaintiffs herein but who have 
not joined as individual plaintiffs herein and who 
are not, to date, rP.presented by the undersigned 
counsel. 
Plaintiff Ht-ribPrto Esquivel is listed on that amended 
Exhibit I, Part B. There was no further filing of notice 
of join<ler by plaintiff. Therefore, the last "practi-
eal notiee" which defendants had was that Esquivel had 
n1Jt joined as a plaintiff. The order of the court which 
allowPd such int(TVt•ntion states specifically: 
All uu·rnhen.; of the class desiring to join as 
partil>s plaintiff herein are to file an appropriate 
noticl· of joinder or otherwise express in writing 
their desire to so join, on or before May 24, 1968. 
(R. 190.) 
Re::;ponch·nts citations to the record (R. 229) does not 
SU]Jport a claimed extension; this is only Respondents' 
motion. No ordt-r granting such motion is cited. Alleged 
plaintiff Es(1nivel filed no notice of joinder. Defendants 
n·1wakdly objeeted to the failure of members of the 
class to intPrvPne, and moved for dismissal without 
•J .., 
prejudice as to those who had not interven(•<l. rn. 
Further objection was made in dPfc>rnlants' llH·inor· 1 ·, anr1 11' 
on damages. (R. 311-312.) Additionally d<>f<'IH.l:tnt· ,
1
• 
• ' (. \lq 
jected orally and moYed to di::m1iss with n•f<.r!'nei· 
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t- 1gr11 the trial. (R. 667.) 
3. The evidence does not support the finding that 
the defendants placed no condition other than 
membership on the payment of strike benefits. 
Respondents assert that the record discloses tha: 
in prior Kennecott strikes the paid :-;trike lwne 
fits to persons who were not within the bargaining unir 
represented by the BLF&:K (Resp. Br. at Rt>spon1]. 
ents fail to mention what else that record discloses. Th1 
record is also very clear that the BLF&E had no know] 
edge that members outside the bargaining unit \We 
being paid. (R. 928.) Martin J l'nsen, in his testimom. 
indicated that the names of persons outside the bar 
gaining unit placed on the 19()7 payroll wen• place1; 
there in error ( R. 930.) and that hi' did not know it um;: 
after the strike. (R. 926-928.) 
4. The evidence does not support the finding that 
plaintiffs Beck, D. P. Bennett, Glen Bennett, 
Carter, James, Kendrick, Tsutsui, Gale and T. 
N. Turner are entitled to recover strike benefits. 
On page 14 of their brief, Respondents atkmpt \(i 
justify the failure of nine plaintiffs to introdnce evi 
dence in their behalf. rrhPI'P is clearly no evidrnce (I' 
reliance by these men in the record. Then' is no en 
4 
denee that they ever heard any representations allegedly 
rnadP h,\· employees of defendants. Respondents admit 
this when they admit these plaintiffs did not answer 
interrogatories propounded to them. Further, there is 
1111 r·vi<lence as to the good standing of these plaintiffs 
smc.r tht>y ·were excluded, by their own counsel, from the 
,.;ii'nlation rPli<>d upon h,\· thP balance of i)laintiffs. (R. 
lOU0-1061.) Tlw fact that none of the other plaintiffs 
failed to sho-\\' reliance certainly has no relevance to 
these nine. This was a spurious class action and these 
plaintiffs had to prove their own case. Thus, plaintiffs 
tkek, D. P. Bt>nnPtt, GlPn Bennett, Carter, James, Ken-
drick, Tsntsui, Gale and T. N. Turner are not entitled 
to recover in this action. The finding of the court allow-
ing thPm to recover is clearly unsupported by the evi-
dence. 
5. Sub-points 4 through 11 of Respondents' brief 
contain numerous incorrect citations to the 
record in this case. The record does not support 
the findings made by the court. 
On pag-(• 11 of their brief, Respondents state that 
th Grand Lodge of Defendant had knowledge of prom-
1s1·s al!Pgedly made because "certain of the handbills 
and flyers which prornisE>d strike benefits were in fact 
i1n•pareJ by the BLF&E in Cleveland, Ohio, and trans-
mitted to TTtah for circulation in the campaign." In 
' 11Jlport of that statempnt, Respondents cite R. 758-759, 
1103-1104 and Exhibits P-54, 60 and 70. The record at 
pag-Ps 738-759 is the testimony of H. E. Gilbert, Presi-
rlent of tlw R L F&E. President Gilbert specifically stated 
5 
that he did not know where the brochure labeled E:, 
hibit 70 was produced. The only evidence that 1·t . \\2' 
produced in Cleveland is "testimony" of plaintiffs' co·" 
' llJJ. 
sel Mr. Rooker. There is no evidence whatsoever in 11
11
• 
record that preparation of that document was snpu 
vised by the Grand Lodge officers of the BLF1&E. Tb, 
record at pages 1103 and 1104 contains testimonv or 
Mr. Trujillo, one of the plaintiffs. Mr. Trujillo stati,d 
that he did not know where Exfobit P-60 was prepared. 
The Union stamp on the back of that exhibit indicatei 
it was printed in Salt Lake City. Trujillo said he dicffi!t 
see Exhibit P-54 until about the time of the deb'1ti· 
(March 24, 1967) or maybe "a little bit after the debate." 
(R. 1104.) He doesn't say where Exhibit P-54 was pro. 
duced. There is no evidence in the record as to who pre-
pared these exhibits or where they were prepared, except 
what is shown on the exhibits themselves. The exhibits 
do not support Respondents' point. 
Exhibit P-70 cited by Respondents in fact supports 
defendants' position. That exhibit contains the follow-
ing statement: 
vVith BLF&E Representation a man get: 
strike pay. (Exhibit P-70, page 1.) (Emphasis 
added.) 
That exhibit clearly shows that strike benefits were con-
ditioned upon representation. One not represented Ii\ 
the Union (not in a bargaining unit represented by th1 
BLF&E) was not entitled to benefits. (See 
Brief [hereinafter cited as App. Br.] at 16-33.) 
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}\Pspondents admit, by their reliance upon the record 
l Cl.t" that Exhibits P-60, 70 and 54 were not used t teV <' 
imtil the final days of the campaign. This is in direct 
contradiction to their statement found on pages 16 and 
l7 of their brief that these exhibits were used "through-
. " out the campaign. 
Respondents cite R. 756-757 and Exhibits P-41 and 
J).1G2 and 163 as -support for the proposition that: 
Iman expressly requested authority from the 
International President to promise all new mem-
bers that they would receive strike benefits, and 
Gilbert gave him that assurance, which was then 
incorporated in a handbill circulated among plain-
tiffs. (Resp. Br. at 12.) 
Those citations in no way support the quoted proposi-
tion. The record, at pages 756-757, reports testimony of 
H. E. Gilbert, President of the Grand Lodge, BLF&E. 
Mr. Gilbert stated that the quotation read to him by 
connse1 for plaintiffs (Exhibit D-162) was correct. There 
no request by Mr. Iman for authority in Exhibit D-162 
or in tlrn record. Further, the quote states that Mr. 
(iilbert assured new members they would receive strike 
henefits "as spelled out in our Constitution." This would 
c!Parly prohibit strike benefits to plaintiffs since the 
BLF&E Constitution allows benefits only to those in a 
hargaining unit represented by the Union and plaintiffs 
were not in a bargaining unit represented by defendants. 
(See App. Br. at 16-21.) Exhibits P-41 and D-163 are 
to the same effect. Both indicate that the only authority 
gn·Pn was to promise strike benefits "in accordance with 
7 
the Com;titution." Further, Exhibit D-Hi;) <'IParh ,1, . ',\(,, 
that Iman had not cleared his "strikP lwnd'it" ]ll'o, llii,,e, 
with the Grand Lodge. (Exhibit D-1G:3, pag(· 2.) · 
The citation by Respondents to the R('<'Ol'(l ll'l. ' ( 
1201-1202 and to Exhibits P-159 and D-U-! on pag" t 
of their brief, is cornplett>ly inaccuratp and out of ('1Jn. 
text. Mr. Iman testifiPd that lw did not know whetlitr 
the "committee" actually talked to Mr. UilhPrt. \YJi,
11 
Mr. Cole, a member of the "committeP," tt•stifit><l, Jllain 
tiffs did not ask him. 
The record doPs not support tlt<· statt>mtn1 
found on page 13 of R0spondPnts' lJl"iPf that cM'endan· 
Grand Lodge ratifil'd "in all n•s1wcts'' thP a<'tiYity 11f 
Mr. Iman. The citations to thP n•(•onl an• all to th· 
testimony of :Mr. Iman and l\lr. Col<>. Cl<·arly, ratifica. 
ti on of an agent's unauthorized arts cannot lw 1n·o1ed 
from the month of the agPnt. Ev<>n if rati f'i<'ation (·01tl1] 
be so proved - those pages of thP record eitt'd h: Re. 
spondents do not contain any ratification. At pagP 
the testimony refers to a period of tiuw prior to an: 
by Iman. Clearly, a prinei pal ('annot rnt,/: 
action before it happens. Page 1:217 contains nntltin: 
remotely related to ratification. 'Tlw fad that (1illll'r: 
never admonished Tman means hP <lidn 't kno\\· wh:r 
Iman was doing, not that he approved of it. 
and 1233 contain testimony of Mr. Co IP to tlw 1 f!'Pc' 
that he had sent certain flyers to r.lr. UillH·rt, 11/11 r th" 
strike began, to show him what WPnt on. ( 'lt'iHly. J[r 
Gilbert did not ratify the conduct of BLlj\\'.E agent' 
after the strike - at that timP he did jn:-;t t}H• opPMit 
8 
_ he rrfus(•d to pay strike lwnefits to plaintiffs. Fur-
ther, the law is dear that a party can only ratify acts 
,rhieh it conld haYP anthorizPd initially. As set forth in 
our IJl'l'\'ious Lrid, tlw Bl, F&E could never have author-
izl·d strih l;Pnefits to tlwsc• plaintiffs. (App. Br. at 
lG-33.) 
RPspondents statP that nneonditional promises of 
l>endits wen• rnadP h;.- defendants throughout the 
conrse of tlw organizational campaign from Octo-
lwr, 19(i(), to .Turn·, 19<>7. (RPsp. Br. at 15.) They cite 
P-1.11, :21, 4-1. 7>1, 72 and 140. Tlwse <>xhibits 
Qii1' no snpport to tltat c·o11t(•ntion. (Se1• diseussion of 
,;a!lll' Pxliihits, i11/r((, at pagl's 
On pag<' lfi of tlH·ir hriPf, Respondents cite inter-
rog«ttory nnsw1·rs IJ>- plaintiff's in support of the propo-
that nn1·mHlitional promises were made "before 
thP drhate on :Mareh :2-t, 10G7.'' These answers do not 
l'lport. lurn·<·Y<·r, stH'h promisPs were made -
whethl:'r two da:-·s li!'fon· or six months before. Note 
!11at man.\ of tl1P plaintiffs (lid not join the BLF&E until 
aflPr tlw dPhatP (.j[arel1 :2-1-, 1%7). (Exhibit D-190). The 
1•Yidrnl'e is c!Par that any ::-;ueh promisPs were not made 
m1til tlie titll(' of tl11· 1l1·liat<'. (SeP App. Br. at 10.) 
gro:;::-; h· eon tradirt themselYes and the . . 
n·rord. ThP;.· intirnat(' that Exhibit P-54 was used all 
dining tlw eampaign and cite as authority 
nf th1·ir own witn<'ss, Mr. Trujillo. (Resp. Br. 
at 1 G.) Th<'>" fail to ('i t1• tlw rest of Mr. Trujillo's testi-
rnon.1 n•ganling Exhibit P-54, preYiously cited by Re-
9 
spondents themselves on page 11 of thPir brid'. J[r 
Trujillo stated, in response to a question as to wh .. !i 
Exhibit P-54 was used: 
I would say that this would havp had to hari· 
been pretty close to the dehate, lwcansp it mi[l'l 
have been a little bit after t}w ddmtP. (R. 11fl+.I: 
This gross rnischaracterization of tlw evidt•nce sl1U11,8 th> 
weakness of Respondents' case. There is no <'Yidene, 
in the record to support a finding that Exhibit P-51 
was used "throughout the campaign." Tht• evidence j, 
to the contrary. 
At page 17 of their brit•f, Respondents completf'!r 
mischaracterize the hrief of dPf endants and tlw proeePd 
to discredit their characterization; an obvious attf1mpt 
to set up and knock down straw men. Although defond-
ants deny the. authority of their represt•ntatives tn 
make such promises, defendants have never asserted that 
promises of strike benefits were not made prior to Feb-
ruary, 1967. Defendants have assPrted, and the record 
clearly shows, that unconditionn.l promises of strikP bm 
fits were not made prior to that time. To that poin1. 
strike benefits had been conditioned upon thP Constitu 
tion of the BLF&E which grants bern·fits on!;· as rm1111-
erated therein. There is no evidenct> whatever in thl; 
record showing unconditional promises being made prior 
to that time. Respondents have pointed to none. '!'ht 
citations in the record (R. 671 and lOGO-lOGl) purporteJ 
ly supporting Respondents' position, do not do so. 'I'l1e 
purported stipulation at page 671 of the n·cord not 
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arceph'<l hy plaintiffs and <>ven had it been, that stipula-
tion referred to strik(' lwnefits "in accordance with the 
Constitution." The stipulation at pages 1060-1061 also 
refprred to strike hf•npfjt:-; in general. That stipulation 
limits promises of strike benefits re-
,r;ardless of tlw ontconw of thP election (unconditional 
pwmisefi) to a period after the dPbat<-. (March 24, 1967). 
Respondents cite Exhibit P-138 in support of their 
propofiition that plaintiffs were included in the strike 
(·all istmP.d hy defE•ndants. (Resp. Br. at 17.) That docu-
lllt'nt sa,\·s nothing of the sort. It does state, in part: 
Autl1orit,\· g-rantPd for peaceful withdrawal 
effrcfrw 12:01 M.D.T. July 15, 1967, unless 
s11tis11rtor.11 s!'ffleme11t can he attained in interim. 
(Emphasis added.) 
The italici:u•d portion of the above quote cl1::•arly shows 
plaintiffs "·en• not inelndPd in the call. It refers to set-
tlPnwnt of tlw disputt> hetwel'n the Union and the com-
pany. 'l'h<> Vnion only has the authority to obtain settle-
nwnts for those in tlw bargaining unit it represents. 
(Rer> App. Br. at lG-21, 29-33.) Plaintiffs were not in 
that unit and hencP wer1' not called out on strike by 
defendants. (R. 1222-12:24.) 
RPspondents, at pagP 18 of their brief, indicate that 
wl1ilt> sening piekd duty they carried a placard stating 
thPy WPre on strike on behalf of the BLF&E. In sup-
port of this proposition, they cite Exhibit P-73. Upon 
examination of Exhibit P-73, it will be noted that there 
nothing- contained thereon stating who carried that 
11 
sign. This sign may well have been carried by on,, oi 
the men in the bargaining unit represented hy thi· 
BLF&E. 
Respondents cite R. 141-142 on page 18 of tliPJ: 
brief. This citation is to defendants' answer. It · in no 
way supports the proposition for which it is cited. 
In the argument covering pages 18 through 21 of 
their brief, Respondents assert that the strike vayroll 
(Exhibit P-78) was valid. They seem to assert that a 
document fraudulently conceived and filled ont by local 
officers then signed by a Grand Lodge officer, with 110 
knowledge of the fraud, is forever binding on the Union 
even after the fraud is tmcovered. Officers of the dP 
fendant Local 844 testified that they put plaintiffs' names 
on the payroll (Exhibit P-78) knowing they w1,re plac-
ing them in improper categories. (Martin .Jensen, R. 
1145-1146.) Such impropriety cannot bind the Grand 
Lodge. 
On page 20 of their brief, Respondents cite t]1P 
BLF&E Constitution (Exhibit P-1, Article 10, Section 
3 (h) [page 197]) for the proposition that strike benefit> 
are "mandatory." This is not so. That provision statc1 
that the payroll should be approved "if correct.'' The 
evidence clearly shows the payroll (Exhibit P-78) '"as 
not correct. (R. 1145-1146.) (See App. Br. at 12.) 
Respondents then cite R. 296 for the proposition 
that defendants paid strike benefits to persons not ,vithin 
the bargaining unit in prior strikes. (R('SJJ. Br. at 
12 
()n page 92G of the record, Martin Jensen is speaking of 
the strike involved in the prrsent suit (not a prior strike) 
ann fnrther he states: 
At the time T made out the payroll there were 
no mernhers, to 111,'\' knowledge, that were not in 
the bargaining unit. 
Jensen then stated that he later found out that 
three or four men were not in the unit. Respondents 
hare completely misstated the record. There is no evi-
dence in the record to show that any letter of explana-
tion was amJended to the strike payroll when signed by 
Brehany, the only officer of the Grand Lodge to 
:<ign it. 
On pages 22 and 23 of their brief, Respondents 
indicate that President Gilbert knew as early as "No-
1Prnher 21, 19GG, that such unconditional promises of 
hrnrfits ,,,ere b(-'ing made." For this proposition, 
they cite nnmerons exhibits in the record, none of which 
iwlieat(· in way that President Gilbert was aware of 
thL·m, and only one of which, Exhibit P-54, says anything 
ah11ut nneonditional strikP benefits. The record clearly 
e>tahlishes that Exhibit P-54 did not come out until 
FPhrnar.'>' or March, 19G7. (R. 889-892; R. 1060-1062; R. 
110-±: R 1181.) En>ry other one of these exhibits 
'''h1eh speaks of strike henefi ts speaks of them "accord-
ing to the The Constitution clearly limits 
hr·ndits to members of the bargaining unit represented 
hY the BLF&E. (SPe App. Br. at 16-21.) Further, none 
r)f the exhibits cited in support of this proposition con-
tain an,v dates indicating when the purported represen-
tations WC'l'e made. :Most of those exhibits contain no 
13 
dates at all. Such a shallow attempt to support thtir 
position indicates clearly that Respondents can produc" 
no evidence that President Gilbert was awar(" of' , h-
promises prior to the commencement of this action. 
Further on page 23 of their brief, Respondents mis-
construe the evidence stating that defendants had "know]. 
edge for a fifteen-week period [prior to the strike] that 
such unconditional promise [sic] of strike benefits had 
been made to plaintiffs and defendants at no time in-
formed the plaintiffs that they would not be paid." This 
is entirely incorrect. There is no evidence that President 
Gilbert had knowledge of these unconditional promise' 
prior to the strike. Plaintiff Trujillo himself testified 
that he helped gather up the flyers to send to President 
Gilbert to show him what went on out here. (R. 11±2-
1143.) This was after the strike had begun. 
POINT II 
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN ITS FINDING 
THAT VALID CONTRACTS HAD BEEN ENTERED 
INTO BY PLAINTIFFS AND DEFENDANTS. THE 
TERMS OF ANY AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE 
UNION AND PLAINTIFFS WERE LIMITED BY 
PROVISIONS OF THE UNION CONSTITUTION. 
THE COURT FURTHER ERRED IN ITS FINDING 
THAT ALLEGED CONTRACTS ENTERED INTO BY 
EMPLOYEES OF THE UNION WERE BINDING 
UPON THE UNION. 
1. The alleged agreement entered into by plaintiffs 
and employees of defendant was clearly pro-
hibited by the Union Constitution. 
Point II, Sub-point 1 of Respondents' brief based 
upon an entire,ly inaccurate reading of Article 10, Sretion 
14 
the BLF&E Constitution. Section 3(a) of Article 
10 states to whom strike benefits may be paid and the 
1 cral rate authorized to be paid. Sub-section (b) is mere-en 
Jy a policy statement referring back to 3(a); it grants 
which was not granted by 3(a). Thus, the 
!imitations found in 3 (a), allowing strike benefits only 
to "members and non-membe.rs engaging in a legal strike 
authorized by this organization" are not affected by sub-
(h). As set forth in our previous brief, sub-
section 3(a) must be interpreted to mean "members or 
non-mt>mbers" in the bargaining unit represented by 
defendants. (App. Br. at 16-21; 30-33.) 
2. Plaintiffs, as Union members, were not "simi-
larly situated" to those other Union members 
in the bargaining unit represented by the 
BLF&E and hence were not entitled to strike 
benefits. 
Subparagraph 2 of Respondents' Point II is also 
upon a misconcc>ption as to the facts. Respondents 
state that union members "similarly situated" were en-
titled to the same benefits. This is absolutely true. This 
is what defendants haYe argued from the beginning. 
Tltt>re is no evidence whatsoever in this record that 
anyone in the position of plaintiffs in this action has 
!wen i11tc11tio11ally granted strike benefits. All persons 
situated have been denied such benefits when 
thPil' has come to the attention of the 
BLF&E. (Ree App. Br. at 6, 13, 14 and 15.) Further, 
on page 27 Respondents state that "the obligation of the 
15 
Union to represent and act on lwhalf oJ' all lnl'nil . . WJ, 
of the same bargaini,ng unit in a fair and .· 
•· 111u 
ntaory mannl'r is wt>ll established." This is ah:solut('j, 
true. The cases cited by defendants do support tlii, 
position. Howevl'r, note thP underlined portion of th, 
foregoing quote from Respondents' hrid. 'l'hPy adiiut 
that the obligation runs only to 11wmlwrs of the 
bargaining unit. As has bePn S<'t forth in our prPriom 
brief, the facts show that plaintiffs WPH' not llH·mber; 
of defendants' bargaining unit. (R. 1223-1224.) (Ste 
App. Br. at 16-21.) Respondents' wholP argUllll'nt in 
this sub-point clearly supports dPf Pndants' 
3. Respondents, as Union members, are not en-
titled to strike benefits allegedly promised by 
employees of the Union if such promises were 
contrary to the Union Constitution. 
First, it should lw pointed ont that R<'spond(·nt;' 
citation to the record in support of the>ir proposition that 
"representatives stated that the lwnPfits w<'re guaran-
teed by the Constitution" (Resp. Br. at 28) is whoUY 
erroneous. Respondents cite R. 39G-397, which, by !rt· 
ter dated October 14, 1969, has bPen amf'rnkd to MU 
R. 1060-1061. Even as anwndPd, this citation is (']rarh 
erroneous. The citation is to the stipulation hL•tween 
counsel for the parties and the>rn is no rnP1ition of thl' 
word "guarantee" whatsoPver in this stipulation. h 
support of their sub-point 3 in Point l I, 
cite numerous insurance cases. Such casPs arP 
inapposite. The instant casf' does not involn an insur 
ance company, and Union strik<' lw1wfits an' in no \l'R 1 
16 
l .k 1 t ·111 111sn ranee henefit. These benefits tn hr I 'f•nN o < • 
are welfarE> hendits. Th(·y are WP!fare henefits offered 
bY a union constitntion, unuPr certain conditions, to 
11
;ernbrrs of a non-profit, unincorporatPd association. 
attempt to likPn a union strike-benefits 
program to immrance is a gross misapplication of the 
Jaw and facts. R<·spondPnts cite no cases which even 
remotd:-· suggest that insnrancP law should be applied 
tn a strikP-lwm·fit situation. 
F,wn if the insurancP cases were applicable, the 
erideJH'<' is c·!Par in this case that plaintiffs were re-
peah·dl>· shown the Constitution of tl1e BLF&E. (R. 
10fi0.1()(i1.) The:-· that on nnmerous occasions 
th1 >. \\"f'l'P shown tl1<> Constitution, e._(J. (R. 832; 869; 951, 
%i: 98:3) and speeifically page 105, r.g. (R. 850, 869; 
0:52; 98:3). ,.\ltliongh tlw Constitution may be 300 pages 
long, the portion of the Constitution relevant here is 
ow· parti('nlar f'Prtion of that document. Plaintiffs' at-
tempt to on pag<> 1 !l;) in order to obt.ain benefits 
hnt say tlwy cannot lw lwld responsible to lmve read 
19(i, wlii(·h is a rontinnation of the same section. 
F'1trtlwr, plaintiffs eontinually characterize themselves 
"nnt1ttorPd" and ''unlettered." The record in this 
does not support that characterization. The record 
,,Jt0m:; no 01w of plaintiffs who 'vas unable to read or 
wnk FnrtliPr, the provisions which defendants rely 
n1 11 m an· print1?d in tht> same size of type as those 
upon wliirh plaintiffs attPinpt to rely. There has been 
no attt>mpt in this Constitution to hide limitations on 
thP of strike h<>nefits. Section 3 ( e) of Article 
lll forth spl?<'ifieally, in language anyone can under-
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stand, that said strike benefits are directon- onl. 
. &J Y 
are not the basis of legal liability on the lJart ol' ·. 
1 tl11 
Brotherhood. There is nothing ambiguous about tlii, 
language. 
On page 31 on their brief, Respondents cite Hi;i. 
ningson v. Bloomfield JJI otors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 
69 ( 1960). This is a case involving the manufacturer\ 
disclaimer of warranty in a product's liability action. 
How that case has any relevance to the instant situation 
is impossible to understand. Further, the record is 
lutely clear, and it was stipulated by counsel for plain 
tiffs, that plaintiffs had access to a copy of the Consti. 
tution from the time they joined the Union. (R. 1060 
1061.) Thus, in order to understand strike benefits, al: 
plaintiffs had to do was read one page in the Constih1-
tion. Several of them mentioned that "page 195" ww 
repeatedly pointed out to them. (R. 850; 869; 952; 983i 
At trial, Respondents knew even the page number of 
the part they wished to rely upon, but now they assert 
that they could not even read the next page of the Con-
stitution due to their "limited education." The BLF&E 
is an unincorporated association made up of memher1, 
many of whom have this same "limited education.'' Th' 
members themselves drafted the Union Constitution 
All of the members are bound hv their Constitution, R' 
was set out in our previous brief. (App. Br. at lo-21, 
29-37.) One member cannot assert a benefit he is not 
entitled to against other members simply by stating he 
has "limited education." 
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J{espondents state that most of the plaintiffs did 
110 t ]uffe access to the BLF&E Constitution "until a later 
datt\'' insinuating that plaintiffs did not get the Con-
siitntion until sometime after they had joined the Union. 
l [(esp. Hr. at 31.) This is cl contrary to the record 
Tlw record is absolutely clear that 
[A] copy of the BLF&E Constitution was either 
gin'n or made available to these plaintiffs before 
or ution joining. (R. 1060.) 
FnrtlJPr, the testimony of plaintiffs themselves shows 
tiiat had access to the Constitution. (R. 850; 869; 
!)52; 983.) 
rrhe insurance cases cited by Re·spondents under this 
Point are all based upon ambiguity in the written docu-
ment. ThP Constitution of the BLF&E expressly states 
that the provisions as to strike benefits are directory 
only and cannot be the basis for legal liability. There 
is no ambiguity whatsoever in Article 10, Section 3 ( e). 
'l1liat provision states in part: 
The provisions of this section concerned with 
liaynwnt of strike benefits are directory only, 
and shall not be the basis of any legal liability 
on the part of the Brotherhood. 
1-'he foregoing clause is not susceptible of more than 
onP interpretation. There is nothing in that clause which 
:t court can construe. Respondents assert no other con-
c'.trnetiou of this provision - they seem to ignore it, 
citing cases based upon ambiguity but pointing to ne> 
amhignity in the provision relied upon by Appellants. 
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In addition, on page 32 Respondents all1""P that th, 
b· , \']I 
comprehension of their bargain was "undonhtPdlv'' !·· 
• (t 
termined by what they read in the Union campaign lf·af 
lets. It is amazing that plaintiffs, being so "untutori·d" 
and "unlettered" could read the campaign leaflets _ 
especially that they could read Exhibit P-54 which pur. 
ports to be material copied directly from tlw BLF&E 
Constitution which they allege they cannot read. TliP 
absurdity of this argument becomPs evident upon it, 
statement. A Union welfare program in the form n! 
strike benefits can in no way be likened to commercial 
insurance transactions. rrhe reliance and f'Xpedation, 
of both classes are in no way similar. 
4. Rights of Union members to receive Union 
funds are clearly governed by the provisions of 
the Union Constitution. 
Plaintiffs' citation of Seal v. Tayco, Inc., 16 Utah 2d 
323, 400 P.2d 503 (1965) is clearly inapposite in 
case. There is no ambiguity whatsoever in the disclaimer 
of liabili tieis found in Article 10, Section 3 ( e) of the 
BLF&E Constitution. That provision is not at all SUE· 
ceptible to two interpretations and need not be intPr. 
preted by a court. See di·scnssion, i»1fra. 
5. The defense of ultra vi res is clearly available to 
defendants. 
On page 34 of their brief, Respondt'nts state that 
the defense of Ultra vires is not available to defen<lant; 
and in support of this proposition cite the Utah Corpora 
tions Code, Utah Code Annotated, Section 
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Tim; citation is clearly inapplicable. As Respondents 
are ·well aware, the BLF&E is not a corporation. It is 
an unincorporated association and clearly not covered 
by the Utah Corporations Code. The cases cited by 
Respondents have nothing to do with the defense of 
1dtra vires. 
R.espondents state that the decision in Amalgamated 
('/nt!ii11g Workers v. Kiser, 174 Va. 229, 6 S.E.2d 562 
(1939) and United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Join-
rrs v. JJioore, 206 Va. 6, 141 S.E.2d 729 (1965) could 
not have been reached under Utah Code Annotated Sec-
tio 16-6-23. This is absurd. The Utah Corporations 
Code does not cover unincorporated associations and in 
no way can it be said that this provision would prevent 
a result as reached in those cases. Those cases are 
squarely in point with the instant case and both hold 
that union members cannot recover on promises made 
by employees of the union when said promises are out-
side the scope of the union constitution. All of the cases 
f'ited by Respondents are cases involving facts not ap-
rlicable to the instant case. It will be noted that Re-
have not bothered to cite the facts of any 
of the cases upon which they rely. Further, Respondents 
lian not distinguished the clearly controlling cases set 
forth in Appellants' brief. 
The defense of ultra vires, a valid common-law de-
fose, as it relates to unincorporated associations, has 
1wt hePn changed by statute in Utah. The statute cited 
hy plaintiffs concPrning the ultra vires defense, Utah 
('odf, Annotated 16-G-23, is m derrogation of the com-
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mon law and must be verv stricth- constn1Pd m11( t • · · t ' sat-
ute cited by Respondents refers to non-profit corpora-
tions. The Unions involved as defendants in thi's casf' 
are not non-profit corporations. Had the legislature 
wished to include unincorporated associations in thi, 
statute, it would have done so. There is a sound policy 
dictating a difference where unincorporated association's 
of members are involved. These associations are made 
up of individual members, none of whom are obtaining 
profit from the association. The defense is especially 
applicable when one group of members is 
to profit from another group by an ultra vires act. Each 
member, when he joins the group, is entitled to re]Y 
upon the protection of the Constitution. One member 
should not be allowed to recover on an unconstitutional 
obligation against a fund created by and for other mem-
bers. Each has the duty to know and understand the pro-
visions of the constitution. See App. Br. at 34, 25-29. 
The cases cited by Appellants in their previous brief 
are apposite and clearly the law. Respondents have 
cited no cases holding otherwise. The cases cited by 
Respondents as support for their proposition that the 
labor union should be treated as a corporation were all 
cases involving suits by an outsider against a labor 
union. None of those cases involved intra-union qnes-
tions such as are involved in the instant case. This is 
clearly a distinguishing factor and while it may not be 
unjust to allow an outsider to recover against the labor 
union as if it were a corporation, it would be 
unfair to allow recoverv bv one member against a funJ 
created by other members. for a specific constitutional 
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purpose unless that purpose were fulfilled. Under the 
Jaw, all union members are bound by the same constitu-
tion. It is noteworthy that plaintiffs make no attempt 
to distinguish Pratt v. Amalgamated Association of 
Stffet and Electrical Railway Employees, 50 Utah 472, 
l(i7 Pac. 830 ( 1917), ::t Utah case which is clearly con-
trolling in this situation. They sidestep that issue by 
stating that it is "ontdated and wholly unjustifiable." 
(RPsp. Br. at 37.) 
POINT III 
THE COURT MAY NOT ALTER THE CONTRAC-
TUAL LIABILITIES OF A LABOR UNION REGARD-
ING STRIKE BENEFITS TO ITS MEMBERS WHICH 
ARE SET FORTH IN THE UNION CONSTITUTION. 
Point III of Respondents' brief, beginning at page 
38, clearly misreads Point III of Appellants' brief. 
spondents continnally argue that Appellants are assert-
ing that the court has no jurisdiction because of the 
provisions of the Union Constitution. This is clearly 
incorrect. The Appellants, in point III of their previous 
briPf, merely assert that the provisions of the Union 
Constitution regarding liability for strike benefits may 
not he ignored by the court. Appellants further argue 
that those provisions are binding upon Union members. 
The cases cited in Appellants' brief clearly sustain this 
argument. Respondents have not bothered to distinguish 
those eases. Appellants have not argued that he court 
sl1011ld be precluded from taking jurisdiction over the 
action hy the BLF&E Constitution. The only argument 
made hy Appellants is that the court, in a dispute be-
tween a union and a nnion member, should be bound 
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by the provisions of the union constitution and Rhon]d 
not grant recovery contrary to those provisions which 
are binding upon all members. There is clearlv no,. •. TlO-
lation of due process involved. Respondents havp triPd 
to create a Constitutional Due Process argument of 
straw so that they can knock it down for its impart 011 
the court. 
Appellants have never asserted that plaintiffs in 
this case had no remedies in court. Appellants haw 
asserted, and still assert, that plaintiffs had a duty to 
exhaust their intra-union remedies prior to going to 
court. Thus, Respondents' argument at page 43 of its 
brief regarding arbitration agreements is clearly another 
straw man. Appellants do not quarrel with the authorit> 
cited by the Respondents that the Utah rule is against 
arbitration agreements. However, Appellants have never 
asserted that the Constitution of the BLF&E constituted 
an arbitration agreement precluding plaintiffs from seek-
ing court action. The Constitution of the BLF&E in no 
way prevents a member from seeking conrt action. It 
is notable that tlw respondents have cit0d no section of 
the Constitution for their assertion. Appellants havr 
never argued that Respondents should "so confine. their 
dispute." Appellants do not assert that the 
above cited in the BLF&E Constitution "purports to 
confer final judicial authority on private arbitratrm 
and tends to divest thP official courts of jnrisdieti0n." 
This was a problem with thP. arbitration clause imolren 
in Barnhart v. Civil Service Employees' Insurance Co111-
painy, 16 Utah 2d 223, 398 P.2d 873 (1965). Appellanti 
have never felt there was anything akin to an arbitra-
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tion agreement involved in the instant case. Article 10, 
Section 3 ( e) of the BLF&E Constitution merely states 
that the provisions on strike benefits do not create a 
legal liability upon defendants. All defendants ask the 
eonrt to do is to interpret that Constitution in the only 
way that it can possibly be interpreted - the provisions 
on strikr benefits may not create a binding obligation 
un the Union. Upon such an interpretation, plaintiffs 
in this case cannot recover. 
POINT IV 
DEFENDANTS HA VE NOT WAIVED ANY RIGHT 
TO Lil\IIT STRIKE BENEFITS BY REASON OF 
EARNINGS OF THE PLAINTIFFS FROM OUTSIDE 
SOURCES. DEFENDANTS ARE NOT ESTOPPED 
FROM ASSERTING SUCH A LIMITATION. 
Throughout their brief, Respondents repeatedly 
rt>fer to plaintiffs as if there were only one plaintiff. 
It should he noted that this was a spurious class action 
anu 190 separate plaintiffs were allowed to intervene. 
Thul', are 191 plaintiffs. Except for common 
41wstions of law and fact, each of these plaintiffs must 
rirove his ffwn case. At page 48 of their brief, Respond-
ents state: 
There is evidPnce that some of the plaintiffs 
wen' ad,·ised and assured by representatives of 
def Prnlants, including Mr. L. L. Iman, who was 
in charge of the campaign, and Mr. Brehany, the 
TntPrnational Vice President, that the Union had 
nt>wr invoked the $150.00 limitation on earnings, 
and would not do so. 
If the evidence does, in fact, say what Respondents as-
sert, and it seems equivocal on that point, such a repre-
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sentation can only aid the person to whom it was 11 d < • ia " 
or communicated. That certainly cannot lw frPatp<l a., 
a common question of fact since all plaintiff 8 wel'e nrir 
even present. The fact that Mr. Fred Oneida 
have been so informed cannot sustain thP claim of am 
other person that he was also so informt>d. Each plam 
tiff had the obligation to show facts com;tituting an 
estoppel if he intends to rely on estoppPl. As to a ma 
jority of the plaintiffs, there is no evidence what:;oevei 
in this record which would sustain an estoppel witl' 
respect to the outside-earnings limitation. -With the ex 
ception of the two or three plaintiffs who testified that 
representations were made to them, the court's finding 
with regard to an estoppel is clearly not supported bi 
the evidence and should be reversed. 
Further with respect to the claimed estoppel, at 
page 48 of their brief, Respondents refer to affidavit> 
supposedly "used as recruiting tools to induce plain-
tiffs to join defendants." In support of this 
they cite the record at pages 878 and 880 (Testimony 
of plaintiff Oneida). This is a completely inaecurate 
and false characterization of the evidence set forth in 
the record. With regard to these affidavits, Mr. 
stated, "I don't believe they were ever used." 
Since evidence of plaintiff's own witnesses indicates that 
these affidavits were nPver use-d, they can certainly givp 
no support to the court's finding regarding an Pstoppel. 
In support of their estoppel argument on page .J:9 
of their brief, Respondents make a completely inacruratl' 
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f, . ·ice to Article 10, Section 3 (i) of the BLF&E Con-rp,cre1 
stitution. Respondents state: 
Read in its entirety, that Constitutonal pro-
vision required that defendants pay to their strik-
ino· members strike benefits for a period of at 
le:st thirty ( 30) days, and that thereafter "all 
officers and members of the organization" ex-
tend "every possible assistance to find employ-
ment for members on strike". (Emphasis added.) 
It is submitted that the use of the word "thereafter" 
bY Respondents is completely inaccurate and mischarac-
terizus that portion of the BLF&E Constitution. Since 
the Constitution speaks for itself, Appellants urge that 
conrt to read that particular provi·sion. 
On pages 49 and 50 of their brief, Respondents 
allege that defendants made no attempt to ascertain the 
n1onthly earnings of their members during the time strike 
IJl'nPfits were being paid or were payable. The citations 
to the record given do not support this proposition. In-
terrogatories answered by plaintiffs clearly show that 
cMendants made inquiries. There is absolutely no evi-
dence in the record as to whether defendants disqualified 
any members dnring the 1967-68 nation-wide copper 
Respondents' statement that "defendants admit-
tedly did not disqualify a single member from strike 
lwnefits during the 1967-68 nationwide copper strike 
reason of outside earnings during the course of the 
(Resp. Br. at 50) is not supported by the evi-
dence. Respondents cite as support the tesimony of 
.\lartin Jensen, the Financial Secretary of the BLF&E. 
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This tPstimony does not snpport Respondents' }Jro . 
• 110,1. 
hon. Mr. Jensen stated that it was not his J·oh t 1. . . 0 (),. 
qualify members for ontsid<=' earnings and that 
fore he liad not donP so. lfo did not ::-;tat<> that thP BLF&E 
had not done so or made inquiries. (R. 929-9:30.) Fur. 
ther, tlw interrogatory amnvers of def Pndants to whicli 
Respodents cite werP never offpred or admitt<•d in Pri 
dence. Therefor0, they are not before tlw court and weri 
not before the trial court for determination of the 
Reliance cannot be had upon these interrogatories anrl 
answers. Even if reliance could be had upon the answeri, 
the answers do not state that defendants rnadP no in. 
qmne·s. 
According to the Constitution of the BLF&E, Articli 
10, Section 3 ( i), a memher Parning in PXC('Ss of 
per month should cut himself off from strike benefib 
by notifying the President of his earnings. J£ach mem-
ber has a duty to notify the International President 
to his earnings and the International President mus! 
then notify the General Secretary and Treasurrr tn 
remove such member's name from tlw payroll. ri1hal 
section allows the International President to 
affidavits of members regarding their earnings, hut it 
does not require him to do so. Affidavits in the form of 
interrogatory answers were required of plaintiffs i11 
this suit because it came to the attention of the Inter 
national President that many of thPm were working at 
outside jobs. Had other incidences of earnings come 111 
the attention of the International President, hP m1tlo11hl_ 
edly would have acted in the same mann0r witl1 rpgaro 
to those members. 
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At page 50 of their brief, Respondents state: 
E. H. Brehany, International Vice President, 
was hinrnelf present on one occasion during the 
organizational campaign when one of the plain-
tiffs Pxpressly infornwd those assembled that he 
had another job which would provide him earn-
ings exePeding $150.00 per month during any 
strike, and was nevertheless assured by the De-
fendant Local's President that he would be eli-
gi11le for strike lwnefits. (R. 1006). Brehany took 
no exception to that assurance. 
As set forth in the Constitution previously cited, it is 
the duty of each member to report his earnings to the 
Presidt'nt. The Constitution puts no burden on the In-
ternational Vice President to make such a report. Fur-
ther, if in fact such conduct could be the basis of an 
estoppel, only thos(_• who ·were present on that occasion 
or who rPliPd on he statement could take advantage of it. 
There is nothing in the record indicating whether any of 
thr plaintiffs other than Mr. Lindauer were present on 
that occasion or relied on that statement. Thus, none of 
tit(' plaintiffs 0xeept l\T r. Lindauer could use such evi-
denrc· to su1iport an estoppel. The trial court erred in 
finding ddendants estopped from asserting this limita-
tion. The facts of the case do not support such a finding 
for eaelt of the plaintiffs. 
On page 51 of their brief, Respondents cite the rec-
ord at pagvs 7H7-SSO, 1002-1004, for the proposition that 
'\k'frndants fa lsdy represented to plaintiffs that, des-
:iih0 tlw langnagE' of the Constitutional provision on out-
,,jr]p earnings, the same had not in the past and would 
29 
not now be invoked against the plaintiffs." Respondent.' 
citation to pages 787 to 880 is compldely unintellig-ible 
They cite 100 pages of the record and it is impossible \(i 
know to what they ref er. Pages 1002-1004 con fain tii" 
testimony of Mr. Fred Lindauer only. Such a statement 
cannot be the basis for an estoppel finding on the part 
of all plaintiffs. If, in fact, that evidence is the basi) 
for an estoppel, it can only be applicable to plaintiff 
Lindauer. The process of intervention in a spurious clasi 
action does not remove the burden on each plaintiff to 
prove his case. Certainly, reliance sufficient to support 
an estoppel is not a common question of fact. 
On page 52 of their brief, Respondents allege that 
def endans knew that BLF&E members had earned in ex-
cess of $150.00 per month during prior strikes and that 
defendants knew that their representatives WPre assur-
ing plaintiffs that no Constitutional limitation was imnk-
ed then and that defendants knew that numerous mem-
bers receiving strike benefits in 1967-68 strike had earned 
in excess of $150.00 per month. In support of thi8, Rµ. 
spondents cite Exhibit P-1, R. 158, 215, 878-880, 898, 
929, 934-935 and 1002-1004. Exhibit P-1 is the BLF&E 
Constitution. Record 158 is plaintiffs' interrogatories li 1 
defendants. Record 215 is defendants' answtirs to plaiu-
tiffs' interrogatories, vd1ich were never offered or ad-
mitted in evidence. Record 878-880 and 898 is testirnon1 
of plaintiff Oneida. RPcord 929, 934-935 is testi11111n: 
of Martin Jensen. Record 1002-1004 is testimony oi 
plaintiff Lindauer. None of the foregoing citations gin 
any indication as to what was knou·n dPf Pndant UraJ11i 
Lodge. It is submited that tlH• evidence clearly indicatei 
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that dd'endant Urand Lodge was not aware that any 
of these promises had been made until after the com-
inenrement of the strike. Mr. Trujillo himself, one of 
the plaintiffs, testified that he gathered up flyers and 
lirncinll'f'S nsed "out here" to send to Mr. Gilbert to show 
]Jim "·hat went on. (R. 1142-1143.) 
POINT V 
IT WAS NOT WITHIN THE TRIAL COURT'S DIS-
CRETION TO ALLOW COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFFS 
TO CIRCULARIZE POTENTIAL PLAINTIFFS TO 
INTERVENE, AND IN SO DOING THE TRIAL 
COURT ERRED. 
The cases cited by Respondents in their brief, page 
:J±, for the proposition that plaintiffs had a right to 
eircularize notice of the spurious class action are equivo-
cal and not controlling. The correct rule is set forth by 
JustirP Piehtt in his dissent in U·nion Carbide and 
Carbon Corportion 'i·. Nisley, 300 F.2d 561 (10th Cir. 
19G2). it would serve no purpose to recite the 
judge's excellent work, Appellants here recommend it 
to this court. 
York v. Guarantee Tnist Company of New York, 
1-:J.'.3 F.2d 503 (1944) was an action by certain note hold-
Pr::; for thcmsPln.'s and on behalf of others similarly 
These notes had been sold to the public through 
Guarantee rrrust Company of New York. The relevant 
portion of the opinion begins on page 528 where dis-
is had n'garding limitations and laches as to 
these unnamed plaintiffs who had not yet intervened. 
TliP eourt held that such plaintiffs could intervene and 
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advantage of the position of the named plaintifh 
m that respect. The question was whether such notr· 
holders conld intervene after judgment. Since the " , 
came up on appeal from the summary judgment grantrrJ 
for defendants, there was no judgment in the cast> whicli 
unnamed plaintiffs could participate in. The case 
remanded and as far as research shows, was never re. 
tired. Thus, even though the court does state that "ap 
propriate steps be taken to notify all note holders to 
intervene (if they have not theretofore done so)" this i,, 
clear dictum and so far as reported no such notice was 
ever granted as allowed. 
In Hormel v. United States, 17 FRD 303 (S.D.XJ 
1955) the court denied a motion by the named plaintiff, 
for an order directing that appropriate steps be taken 
to notifq all persons sirnlarly situated to intervene in 
the action, decision in whch was being appealed by de-
fendant. In clear dictum, the court stated: 
I can see nothing wrong about the plaintiffs 
circularizing all others with similar claims against 
the Government. 
This was not the motion be of er the court. The court in 
the Hormel case went on to enumerate the many possible 
abuses to this process and in response to plaintiffs' ar-
guments attempting to sustain notice, stated: 
The natural answer to those argument' 
would be that these plaintiffs are not their broth· 
ers' keepers. H onncl v. United States, :mpra, 
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rehe court goes on to state: 
If litigants are to be given any such novel 
and revolutionary rights, courts should be author-
iv•d by statute or court rule to accord it. Hormel 
v. United States, supra. 
ri1ltis is c!Parly def Pndants' position in the instant case 
and as expressed defendants' prior brief, no such ac-
tion ran be allowed absent proper legislation. The solici-
tation carried ont in the instant case under the apparent 
authority and recognition of the court is clearly pre-
jlldicial to defendants and contrary to the law. 
POINT VI 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN THE MEASURE OF 
DAMAGES USED TO COl\IPUTE THE JUDGMENT. 
1. Damages must be limited to those damages 
proximately attributable to the plaintiffs' re-
liance upon the actions of defendants' agents. 
At page 55 of their brief, Respondents shrug off 
AppPllants' argument with regard to damages by the 
nwre statement that these arguments are "irrelevant, 
lwcanse plaintiffs relied upon something other than the 
apparent authority of defendants' agents to make the 
nrnd(·.'' Yet, Respondents cite no evi-
dence in the record of any actual authority given to de-
fenclants' employees to make such representations. It 
is snhmittccl that the record is devoid of any evidence 
inrlieating actual authority for such representations. Fur-
tlw Constitution of the BLF&E, Exhibit P-1, clearly 
limits tl1e scope of any such representations as set forth 
ah°' P. The only possible theory of recovery remaining 
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to Respondents is one based upon apparc•nt autli · 
01'1(\ 
Respondents make no response to Appellants' l)J'( .· · 
' '\ 11111 .• 
arguments relating to the measure of daman·es ,1.1 h' 11•11 
apparent authority is involved. Appellants rely 011 tb 
argument. (App. Br. at 52-57.) 
2. Estoppel is not a substitute for consideration 
and the measure of damages to a plaintiff who 
has relied upon the apparent authority of de-
fendants' agents to make representations are 
those damages proximately attributable to 
plaintiffs' reliance upon the actions of def end. 
ants' agents. 
Respondents' argnm\Cmt at page fl5 of tlwir hrii·f 
that estoppel is a substitute for consideration and tlin1. 
fore a plaintiff who has relied should receive thP vah11· 
of the contract is wholly without merit. The casr reliPd 
upon by Respondents, Easton v. Wycoff, 295 P.2d 
is completely miscited by Respondents. That case i11 
volved an oral agreement to leasP real estate. Tlt1 
action was by the lessee to recover damages for hrPnrl 
of contract when the lessor refused to sig-n a writt1c 
lease. The lessee's theory was that the statnt<:> of fraud· 
could not be relied upon by the lessor sinee in fact tl11• 
lessor had agreed to reduce the oral agreement to writint 
and had never done so. rrhe case in no holds that 
estoppel is a substitute for consideration on a contnll'L 
In fact, the case holds that there was no estop1wl mi 
the facts presented. Dictum in the case 1rha1 
is required to invoke estoppel against a dr·frmw bafPli 
upon the statute of frauds. In dictum the court stair' 
that under certain circumstances estoppel might lw ' 
34 
snbstitute for part performance in order to take an oral 
out from under the statute of frauds. How-
-,.,r the facts were not present in that case to justify 
t'\ \ ' 
an estoppel. Hespondents' citation to II Williston, Con-
trnds, 8eetion 553A is unintPlligible to counsel for de-
frndants. No such section or volume has been found 
and JwncP no rc1sponse to that citation can be given. The 
(·i!ations to the Restatment given are completely in-
appo:o;ite. Section 20 is entitled "Requirement of Mani-
festation of Mutual Assent" and refers to ways in which 
mut1wl assent to a contract can be given. Section 90 
refrrs to "Promises Rc>asonably Inducing Definite and 
Action" and has nothing to say about estop-
JH'l being a snhstitute for consideration. In all the illus-
trations ginn und(•r 8ertion 90, tlwre was consideration 
in the form of substantial performance. If plaintiffs 
an, awarded any damages, said damages must be lim-
ited to those proximately caused by their reliance, as set 
forth and supported in Appellants brief at pages 52 
through 57. 
II' plaintiffs m fact relied upon defendants' repre-
,oentations to the extent of paying dues and performing 
'trike duty, no evidence as to the extent of such reliance 
fonnd in the record. There is no evidence as to how 
man) times each plaintiff performed strike duty, or as 
to tlw amount he paid in dues. The record, in fact, 
rndicates that most of the plaintiffs were suspended for 
non1myment of dues in August and September of 1967. 
Thie: \ras on<-' month after the strike began. (Exhibit 
P-190.) lf there was any reliance upon the part of 
J'laintiffs as far as the record goes, said reliance was 
miniscule and cannot be the basis for the f'-'" 
'-vO\'en 
granted in the trial court. In the minutes of the loi;i 
lodge membership meeting of .July 27, 1967, it is statfi[ 
that during this strike members' dues would be rE'duepil 
to $1.85 per month. That same minute Pntry states thai 
picket assignments would be six hours eYery other \\'eek 
(Exhibit P-72.) At most, said recoyery should br lim 
ited to the damage proximately incurred hy plaintiff, 
due to their reliance, e.g. refund of dues paid or pay. 
ment for hours worked on picket duty. Even if 
ment Section 90 were applicable, the examples 8tatel. 
therein all contain instances wherein consideration in 
the fonn of substantial perf onnance was given by tlir 
promissee. In the fourth example where the 
did not make any substantial iwrformance, the exarnpJ, 
holds the promissor's promise is not binding, >1q1 
porting defendants' theory set forth in its pre.vions brief. 
POINT VII 
THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURTS OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER 
OF THIS ACTION IS PREEMPED BY THE NATION-
AL LABOR RELATIONS ACT. 
At pages 56 and 57 of their brief, 
state that there is evidence in the record that a prnrn111 
of strike benefits regardless of election result' 11:1.· 
made from the inception of the campaign. In snp1 111r' 
of this proposition, Respondents cite the record at 
671. Upon perusal of page 671 in the record, the c1111:1 
will find that this is a stipulation offered L;-' 
for defendants and never accepted by couns<·l for 
tiffs. Further, the stipulation stah>s that: 
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The benefits of membership in the Brother-
hood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen were 
pointed out to these people as part of the organi-
zation campaign and that included within such 
benefits was that with reference to the payment 
of strih benefits in accordance with the Consti-
tution. 
Tlii;; 1rns no admission of unconditional promises of 
strik(" benefits. It states that strike benefits were prom-
iHed in accordance with the Constitution. As explained 
in our }Jrevions brief, the Constitution clearly limits the 
pa>1nent of strike benefits to members of the bargaining 
unit represented by the BLF&E. (App. Br. at 16-29.) 
Rrspoudents cite the\ stipulation found on pages 1060 
and 10(11 of the rt>cord. That stipulation states: 
From and after the debate between the com-
peting labor organizations in the election cam-
paign, 24, 1967, it was represented to plain-
tiffs that they would be paid strike benefits if 
they were members in good standing and voted 
for thP BLF&E at the NLRB election regardless 
of the outcome of such election. 
is not an unconditional guarantee from the 
/i,»1 of the campaign. '11his stipulation was specifically 
limited to the period after l\farch 24, 1967. Further, this 
stipulation required that members vote for the BLF&E 
in the election. There is no evidence whatsoever 
in the record that any of the plaintiffs voted for the 
BLF&E in thP NLRB election. As a matter of fact, 
d»f Pndnnts lost the election. This citation to the record 
clear].\· (loP:-i not support the position alleged by plaintiffs. 
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As further support for this proposition, Respond 
ents cite Exhibits P-1, P-11, P-21, P-±1, J>-51 p_70 1 
1 
' anr 
P-140. These exhibits do not support the proposition 
for which they are cited. Exhibit P-1 is the BLF&E 
Constitution which clearly limits strike benefits to lllern. 
bers of the Union in the bargaining unit represented ln , 
the Union. Exhibit P-11 says nothing whatsoever aboi;t 
1 
unconditional promises of strike benefits. It mereh 
states the opinion of one man regarding 
1 
made as to strike benefits. It says nothing about what : 
these commitments were. 
Exhibit P-21 speaks of unconditional guarantees bnt 
the man who wrote that letter states that he did not 
arrive in Utah until after the debate. Hence, any c01n 
ments he makes regarding promises of strike benefil1 
must refer to a time after March 24, 1967, and cannot 1 
be said to apply "from the inception of the campaign." 
Exhibit P-41 is a letter to H. E. Gilbert from Carl 
L. Morelli. This letter speaks of unconditional promisei 
with respect to the date of the March 24 dtibate. Thii 
letter in no way supports the proposition that such un-
conditional promises were made from the beginning of 
the campaign. 
Exhibit P-72 contains excerpts from thP of 
the meetings of Lodge 844, BLF&E. At no place in 
these minutes is there any specific mention of striln· 
benefits, much less unconditional promises of :;trik' 
benefits. 
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EJxhibit P-140 is apparently a draft of a brochure. 
Tt is undated, contains pencilled in and lined out pro:vi-
sions and contains no reference whatsoever to strike 
benefits regardless of election outcome. The only refer-
i·neP to strike hern•fits is found in the first paragraph 
1rherr it staks: 
The Brotherhood pays strike benefits directly 
to members. This one fact alone make·s the Com-
pany respect our bargaining power. Hundreds of 
thousands of dollars in strike benefits have been 
paid to Brotherhood members at Bingham Can-
yon down through the years. (Emphasis added.) 
The ahon'-quoted statement specifically relates pay-
ment of strike benefits to bargaining power. As set 
forth in our previous brief, this is absolutely true. Only 
those people for whom the BLF&E could bargain, those 
in the bargaining unit represented by the BLF&E, were 
eligible under the BLF&E Constitution to obtain strike 
benefits. (App. Br. lG-29.) 
At page 58 of their brief, Respondents state: 
The record in this case establishes that plain-
tiffi", in an effort to determine whether or not 
defrndants' preemption argument had any merit, 
sought an official determination by filing a charge 
with the National Labor Relations Board. 
Rrspondents go on to state the nature of their alleged 
action. Notable, however, is the absence of any citation 
to the record. The record in this case does not establish 
any snch c·f forts by anyone. 
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POINT VIII 
SECTION 501 OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT 
REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT PREVENTS 
RECOVERY BY PLAINTIFFS IN THIS ACTION. 
On page 64 of their brief, Respondent8 state that: 
The fact that dcf endants paid strike 
to some of their members engaging in this 
strike, as the record clearly establishes, should be 
sufficient to establish beyond doubt that no claim 
is or can be made that defendants did not author-
ize the strike. 
In support of this proposition, Respondt•nts citP the rec-
ord (R. 917-939, and Exhibits P-179 to 84 [sic]). The 
record cited is the testimony of }\f artin .frnsen and it 
clearly indicates that defendants knowingly paid strike 
benefits only to those memlwrs in the bargaining unit 
which they represented. These were the only persons 
for which the BLF&E could authorize a strike. The 
testimony further indicates that the only members out-
side the bargaining unit who paid strike benefits 
were paid erroneously and without knowlPdge of the 
fact that they were not in the bargaining unit. Such 
information did not come to the attention of the BLF&E 
until the strike was over. (R. 926-928.) The citations 
to Exhibits P-179 to 84 are completely unintelligible. 
These exhibits are all flyers put out by the Mine-Mill 
and Smelter Union. They have absolutely no relevance 
to the proposition for which they are cited by respond· 
en ts. 
40 
